Irony and Solidarity: Two Key Concepts of Richard Rorty

Irony and solidarity are two key concepts characteristic of the vocabulary of Richard Rorty. Their thematization can be done on a narrower or wider basis of texts. In the present paper I attempt to contextualize and reconstruct them against the background of other important concepts of Rorty’s vocabulary, such as, first of all, the concept of contingency. The concept of irony is shown to derive, for Rorty, from Sartre’ conception of the humans who are claimed to be what they are not, and not to be what they are. The non coincidence of humans with themselves, or, with their „essence,” is argued to lead the way to the basic attitude of irony. The concept of contingency may be shown to lead up to the concept of solidarity as well, in that the realization that what we are we are in a contingent way implies the possibility of being radically other than what we happen to be. (I.) In a second step, the basic concepts of Rorty, thus far reconstructed, are shown to be dependent on Rorty’s basic philosophical stance of anti-foundationalism; the latter is claimed to have a hermeneutical background. (II.) In a final part the outlines of a tradition are sketched from Kant to the present, characterized by an anti-metapyhsical flow, whereby the importance of solidarity and morality is stressed without the attempt to anchor it in a metaphysical theory of humans or any kind of epistemology destined to provide knowledge rather than hope. Indeed, Rorty shows that hope stands over and above knowledge, and it contributes to making us humans more than a project to attain any kind of (secure) knowledge is ever capable of.

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